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In 2014, Detroit was ranked 8th on a list of the country’s 10 unhappiest cities. Despite its
glorious past, the city is now in deep trouble. Four phenomena contributed to Detroit’s
placement on the list and set Detroit apart from other large American cities.
First, Detroit has too much land and too few residents. The city stretches over 139
square miles. Detroit is vast. And when a sprawling city loses more than 60 percent of its
population, such a mass exodus leads to other problems. In its heyday, Detroit was teem-
ing with people. In 1950, the population was 1.85 million. By 1990, the population had
dwindled to 1.2 million. And today, less than a million people, only about 714,000, are
rattling around the city. Detroit is empty. And that means unlike New York or San Fran-
cisco, where finding even a tiny square to park your car is an ordeal, in Detroit, land is
plentiful and affordable. Developers need not build up, they can spread out. Housing is
dirt-cheap. You can buy a house in Detroit for $25,000. Today, many blocks in Detroit are
home to a single family, living amid a sea of unoccupied, boarded up homes. The city
struggles to provide basic services—trash pickup, water, electricity, and police and fire
protection—to these isolated homeowners. As a result, Detroit’s tax rate is way too high,
especially given the sketchy services homeowners receive in return. A core assumption of
urban sociology is that cities grow, and growth is a clear signal that a city is thriving. But
Detroit is not growing, it is shrinking, posing a new set of challenges for urban scholars
and planners. The path forward for the city is much debated among scholars, practition-
ers, and residents alike, with supporters insisting, “To grow Detroit, you have to shrink
Detroit!”
Second, Detroit is stigmatized as a crime ridden, undesirable place to live, in part be-
cause of a large black presence: The city is 87 percent black. About 30 percent of residents
live in poverty. Only 38 percent of Detroit residents are employed within the city’s bound-
aries, as opposed to the suburbs. There is virtually no real demand for housing apart from
investors hoping to flip foreclosed homes and make a quick buck. Gentrification is un-
der way in only a few select neighborhoods. We know from Reynolds Farley’s attitudinal
studies of neighborhood preferences that most whites are not willing to live in a city like
Detroit. The influx of young college graduates, artists, and entrepreneurs is a hopeful
sign, but scholars disagree as to whether the presence of these special interest groups will
revive Detroit.
Third, Detroit is not known for its amenities. A return migration from the suburbs back
to the city is underway in many metropolitan areas around the country as empty nesters,
bored with the placid suburban life they once valued back when they had children living
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at home, now seek walkable communities with a broad selection of restaurants, shopping,
and the arts. Edward Glaeser along with his coauthors Jed Kolko and Albert Saiz coined
the term “consumer cities” to refer to cities organized around consumption rather than
production. Detroit is not that place. It is a one-industry town struggling to remake itself
in the wake of the demise of the auto industry.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly to the authors contributing to this symposium,
Detroit is a city wrestling with its earlier commitment to decentralization. In 1974, the
city established a charter granting community councils the power to weigh in and shape
policy, including urban renewal, planning and zoning decisions, crime prevention, and
so on. Some argue that, once community councils took root the city government abdi-
cated its responsibility to its citizens. Others welcome the activist agendas of residents
and the potential for regional cooperation with Detroit’s suburban neighbors. The arti-
cles included in this symposium contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the ongoing
debate about the long-term impact of decentralization.
Peter Eisinger’s article picks up where his 2003 City & Community article left off. There,
Eisinger argued that while political elites and developers attempt to reinvent Detroit by
circumventing the city’s legacy as an industrial powerhouse characterized by pervasive
racial residential segregation, the development models they propose instead—Detroit as
a world-class city, as a tourist destination, or as the economic hub for the metropolitan
area—are all so quixotic as to be unattainable. To claim that Detroit is poised to become
“one of the world’s premier cities” in the face of consistent evidence to the contrary,
he argued, strains credibility and undermines the public’s trust in their elected officials.
At the same time, reconstructing Detroit primarily as a destination for tourists or subur-
banites risks alienating the city’s residents, whose economic and political interests differ
substantially from those of outsiders. Eisinger’s article in this issue reassesses his 2003 cri-
tique in the aftermath of the city’s bankruptcy proceedings. Now more than ever, Detroit
desperately needs a clear path forward. The three original development models for the
city are still in play, but a fourth vision, Detroit as a destination for “urban pioneers,” has
emerged too as young artists and college graduates migrate to the city, lured by cheap
rents and the entrepreneurial spirit that has taken root in the city. The urban pioneers
model also includes the expansion of activism among older residents, who take the initia-
tive to organize safety patrols in the absence of a dependable police presence, demolish
boarded-up buildings that the city has long ignored, and create car-sharing networks
as a substitute for Detroit’s inefficient public transportation system. In Urban Fortunes,
Logan and Molotch challenged the established view that economic growth is inherently
good, suggesting instead that there are significant costs to development, benefitting some
groups while oppressing others. In observing that each vision reinforces cleavages—race,
class, tenure, and age—rather than uniting all the city’s residents and neighborhoods un-
der a common cause, Eisinger illuminates these costs in the Detroit context. Until these
conflicts are resolved, Detroit will not recover.
Reynolds Farley’s article also takes the 2013 bankruptcy of Detroit as a point of depar-
ture. To understand how Detroit became the largest city in the United States to file for
bankruptcy, Farley assesses the role of race relative to other explanatory factors. Given
Detroit’s racially divisive history, many readers may assume that racial division is the pri-
mary cause of Detroit’s economic collapse. Through historical analysis of the competition
for neighborhoods, schools, and employment among black and white residents, Farley
103
CITY & COMMUNITY
argues that the path to bankruptcy is rooted in a long history of invidious distinctions by
race, but the more immediate factors are deindustrialization and suburbanization.
Some scholars and urban planners believe that regionalism—economic interdepen-
dence between Detroit’s local government and suburban municipalities—is the best strat-
egy to ensure Detroit’s prosperity. Michael Indergaard’s article examines the evidence
buttressing this claim. While he notes that a few urban–suburban coalitions have formed
in recent years, Indergaard questions whether regionalism will live up to its promise. For
one thing, he shows that these alliances have been sustained in part through a combi-
nation of the carrot—incentives provided by foundations and federal agencies—and the
stick—local judges ordering municipalities to cooperate. These alliances do represent a
sea change compared to the 1974Milliken Supreme Court decision upholding marked di-
visions between the Detroit public school system and its suburban school districts. Today,
there is far more cooperation across municipal boundaries. But because they are blinded
by the mere formation of these alliances, Indergaard posits that new regionalists under-
estimate the extent to which familiar divisions such as race and class, as well as emerging
divisions such as uneven development, undermine regionalism in the metropolitan area.
When the auto industry crashed, Detroit’s diverse suburban communities did not ex-
perience these economic crises in the same way. In addition, Indergaard finds that the
coalition’s political elites tend to advance their own interests over and above those of dis-
advantaged groups. Resources distributed through these metropolitan area coalitions are
concentrated in the communities that elites prefer to frequent, such as Detroit’s Midtown
and Downtown neighborhoods, rather than spread evenly throughout the city, a process
that perpetuates inequities within the city’s boundaries.
Rebecca Campbell’s article coauthored with Jessica Shaw and Giannina Fehler-Cabral
explores how and why Detroit’s police department managed to amass more than 10,000
untested rape kits. At first blush, the article is not an obvious fit in a special issue focused
on whether it is possible to revive Detroit. But, as Jane Addams explained, a city cannot
solve major problems until it has a structure in place to ensure the safety and security
of residents. With respect to sex offenses, Detroit is not yet safe. In too many U.S. cities,
police departments have failed to routinely test rape kits, the most important evidence
in the prosecution of individuals accused of rape. The problem is not unique to Detroit,
but when combined with demographic data—extreme racial residential segregation, an
escalating poverty rate, and in the 1990s, a ranking as the U.S. city with the highest rate
of violent crime, Detroit stands out as a particularly egregious case of police negligence
and misconduct regarding the prosecution of sex crimes. Rather than testing the rape
kits, police officers stacked them in a storage room. Through in-depth interviews and
analysis of memos circulated between police officers and prosecutors, Campbell, Shaw,
and Fehler-Cabral find that police officers failed to take accusations of rape seriously in
a city where victims are disproportionately black and poor. Both groups are less likely to
be perceived as credible when they report a crime. The authors find police officers rea-
soned in their reports that victims were not really raped, invoking deep-seated stereotypes
of black women as sexually available. Officers tended to assign rape victims the offensive
label of “prostitute” and, operating under the equally misguided belief that prostitutes
cannot be raped, declined to process their rape kits. Teenage victims were also dismissed
as liars, as kids concocting stories about having been raped to avoid getting into trouble
at home. Although the nation is currently fixated on Ferguson and Staten Island, notori-
ous examples of police misconduct worthy of our attention, the authors show that police
104
INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE: LESSONS FROM DETROIT
recalcitrance and unwillingness to admit wrongdoing are serious problems in sexual as-
sault cases too. Detroit cannot prosper so long as the city’s streets are unsafe. The city is
only just beginning to resolve its rape kits problem after finally reversing course on the
procedure for processing this evidence.
Laura Reese’s article evaluates Detroit’s inability to solve what has quickly become
an enormous stray animal population problem. Reese observes that while scholars have
studied the ways in which urbanization encroaches on the natural habitats of a region’s
wildlife, little is known about the conditions under which wild animals invade the cen-
tral city, an inevitable outcome of urban sprawl. Detroit’s economic collapse contributed
to the sharp rise in stray animals, as unemployed and underemployed residents tend to
abandon their pets. But Reese argues a struggling economy is not the only factor, indeed,
it is not the primary factor. Instead, Detroit’s decentralized governmental system is the
root cause of the stray animal problem. Detroit’s political leadership has not organized
consistently or successfully to control a burgeoning stray animal population, a crisis affect-
ing poor neighborhoods disproportionately. The Detroit Animal Control agency has a to-
tal of three licensed animal control officers. As a result, nonprofits have emerged to do the
hard work that the city cannot. However, Detroit is isolated from the metropolitan area’s
animal welfare agencies. Through analysis of the service provisions of animal welfare or-
ganizations, Reese finds little evidence in support of regionalism. Detroit’s leadership
has minimal ties to suburban animal welfare organizations. These agencies, composed
primarily of white women volunteers, share resources and volunteers among themselves,
but they report minimal cooperation with Detroit’s animal shelters.
Together these articles show that there is little consensus among residents, public offi-
cials, and community leaders about the best path forward for Detroit. The authors con-
tributing to this issue hint that Detroit can be saved, but clearly any intervention should
protect the interests of all of the city’s residents.
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